



StM book symposium

Clark's two missions

1. Embodied, environmentally embedded cognitive science
2. The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition

Embodied, environmentally embedded cognitive science

- information self-structuring
 - embodied agents structure their own information flows in ways that support richer forms of adaptive and cognitive success.
- Cognitive niche construction

The Hypothesis of Extended mind

1. The Parity Principle
2. Functional systems create genuine mental states
3. Real-world extended systems can be profitably analyzed as unified cognitive wholes

Rupert's position

- Embedded is enough
- Clark is really talking about internal processes and representations anyway.
- The enduring "obligate" system is the right one to study
- this does not rule out relations with material environment, they simply are not part of the "cognitive" system.

Moves that hide culture

- focus on the environment, rather than culturally constructed habitats. (Sterelny)

Diving Spider



Wheeler

- parity principle
 - If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process. (StM: 8)

Is there no better definition of "cognitive"?

- This must be the wrong criterion.
- It grants to processes "in the head" the status of the measuring stick against which things will be judged cognitive or not.
- This does not *define* cognitive as what is in the head. But it does say that in-the-head is the gold-standard for participation in cognitive systems.
- **Extended** not only assumes a center, this principle gives special status to the center in an unmotivated way.

Where do we find a bench mark for parity?

- Folk intuition?
- Theory laden account?
- Clark rejects both, so where can he get his "locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive"?

What's really at stake?

